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This paper examines the development of risk-based 
supervision of pension funds in Australia.  The large 
number of pension funds has meant that since the 
inception of pension fund supervision in the early 
1990’s the regulator has sought to identify high risk 
funds and focus its attention on these funds.  However, 
the regulator developed a more sophisticated risk-
rating model, known as PAIRS/SOARS, in 1992 in 
order to apply a more disciplined and consistent ratings 
methodology.  Four reasons are given for the move 
towards more sophisticated risk-based supervision: 1) 
creation of an integrated supervisor which allowed the 
use of techniques used in banking and insurance to be 
This paper—a product of the Financial Policy Division, Financial Systems Department—is part of a broader project on 
risk-based supervision of pension funds conducted in collaboration with the IOPS - the International Organization of 
Pension Supervisors, and also part of a broader effort of the department to improve the performance of private pension 
systems. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The project coordinators 
may be contacted at rrocha@worldbank.org, gbrunner@worldbank.org, or rhinz@worldbank.org.  
adopted for pension fund; 2) the need to better use 
available supervisory resources; 3) several pension fund 
failures; and 4) concerns about industry weaknesses.  
Supervisory techniques used particularly in the banking 
industry, such as universal licensing, ‘fit and proper’ 
assessment, and risk management requirements were 
adopted for the pension sector between 2004 and 2006.  
The paper provides an outline of the PAIRS/SOARS 
risk-rating model which was also adopted.  It observes 
that the approach provides an analytical discipline to risk 
assessment, strengthens the link between risk assessment 
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This report is part of a project on risk-based supervision of pension funds coordinated by 
the Financial and Private Sector Development Division of the World Bank, and initiated 
in response to a growing number of requests from member countries for assistance in the 
area of pension supervision.  The project is being implemented in collaboration with the 
International Organization of Pension Supervisors (IOPS), and involves the identification 
of good practices in risk-based supervision of pension funds, based on a number of 
carefully selected country studies. These good practice guides are expected to benefit a 
large number of supervision agencies in developed and emerging countries, and 
contribute to a better performance of private pension systems. 
The project will draw on the experience learned in countries that have implemented a 
risk-based supervision approach and apply this knowledge to assist developing countries.  
Models of risk-based supervision demonstrate benefits to be gained from moving away 
from a focus on individual transactions and strict compliance with a range of specific 
rules towards greater awareness of the risk profiles of supervised entities.  A risk-based 
approach provides encouragement to supervised entities to place a greater focus on risk 
management in their daily operations, and promotes a safer and sounder financial system.  
It is expected that over time moving to a risk-based approach to supervision will create 
scope for supervisors to focus resources on areas of highest risk and, over time, result in a 
more efficient use of supervisory resources. 
The Australian case provides a model of risk-based supervision which applies to both 
defined contribution and defined benefit pension funds, covers a broad range of 
institutions in terms of size and complexity, and applies to both open “public offer” funds 
and closed occupational funds.  The Australian case provides a structured methodology 
for ranking pension funds according to the relative threat of failure and maps this to a 
supervisory response framework.  The main focus is to ensure that all pension entities 
meet their “financial promises” to members and beneficiaries.  Within the Australian 
model some additional focus is given to funds which offer defined benefits.  The model 
makes a distinction between larger funds which are subject to detailed assessment and 
smaller funds which are subject to a streamlined and more automated assessment. 
This report is a condensed version of a more detailed analysis of the Australian system 
undertaken by Graeme Thompson. The author is a consultant and former Chief Executive 
Officer of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. The author is grateful to Chris 
Gaskell, Juanita Hoare, Karen Kay, Charles Littrell, Darryl Roberts, Peter Vodicka and 
Melisande Waterford at APRA for their assistance and for Roberto Rocha for comments 
on earlier drafts.  The condensed version of the report includes some minor changes to 
reflect developments since the original report was written. 
  
I.  Introduction 
Australia’s framework for prudential regulation of pension (or superannuation) funds 
originated in the early 1990s when the central government introduced a near-universal 
system of compulsory employer contributions. The framework relied heavily on the 
‘prudent person’ approach, deriving from the fiduciary duties of the trustees who 
managed both employer and employee contributions in trust fund structures. This 
approach was consistent with the broad deregulatory philosophy that prevailed in 
Australia from the mid 1980s when interest rate and exchange rate controls were largely 
removed, along with quantitative restrictions on banks’ asset portfolios. No restrictions 
were imposed on superannuation funds’ investment composition other than rules to 
prevent gearing and the misuse of funds by employers.  
There were several thousand supervised funds, including retail funds, industry funds 
associated with labor unions and funds sponsored by single employer companies. As a 
result of this industry structure and the limited supply of regulatory resources, prudential 
regulation was risk-based from the beginning in the sense of seeking to identify the 
higher risk funds and to focus more attention on those. This approach then guided the 
allocation of the regulator’s time and effort. 
Identification of high-risk funds relied on off-site analysis of statistical and other 
information submitted, external audit and actuarial reports and on-site supervisory 
reviews. In addition, certain categories of funds received closer attention than others. 
Retail funds - which tended to be bigger than other types and whose boards of trustees 
did not include employee representatives - were subject to licensing conditions and to 
more onerous ongoing attestation requirements. All large funds were required to submit 
statistical information more frequently than small funds. Regulators also conducted on-
site reviews of large funds more frequently. 
The regulatory framework has evolved a good deal over the past decade and refinements 
continue to be made. This evolution has been shaped by experience, by changes in 
industry structure and practice and by regulatory reorganization. Its main objectives have 
been to develop more sophisticated advance indicators of risk and to give regulators the 
resources necessary to interpret those indicators and act pre-emptively and effectively.  
Basic reliance on the ‘prudent person’ philosophy has been retained, but regulation now 
describes in much more detail what a prudent person approach to managing 
superannuation contributions means in practice. This paper summarizes that evolution in 
Australia’s regulatory framework and describes the present system. 
 
II.  Pension System 
Australia’s arrangements to provide post-retirement income for its workforce comprise 
three ‘pillars’: 
•  a means-tested indexed pension paid by the central government and 
funded from general taxation revenue 
  2•  compulsory employer contributions into superannuation funds that finance 
pensions or lump-sum payments on employees’ retirement – this 
component has been significant only since 1992 
•  voluntary private savings, including employer and employee contributions 
to superannuation funds. 
The government-funded pension under the first pillar remains a major source of 
retirement income, with approximately 54 percent of individuals of qualifying age – 65 
years for men and 63 (this will increase to 65 years by 2014) for women – receiving a full 
pension and another 28 percent receiving a part-rate pension. The full pension is 
maintained at one-quarter of the average wage. The relative importance of the pension 
will decline gradually as the second retirement income pillar matures. However, the 
ageing of the population means the annual cost of the government pension will still rise 
as a proportion of gross domestic product from its present level around 3 percent. 
The second pillar comprises the Superannuation Guarantee (SG), under which employers 
have to contribute a percentage of their employees’ wages and salaries to a 
superannuation fund. The only exceptions are for employees earning very low amounts, 
part-time employees under 18 years of age and employees aged 70 and over.  Around 90 
percent of Australia’s 12 million workers are now members of a superannuation scheme. 
The SG percentage commenced at 4 percent (3 percent for small employers) in 1992 and 
increased progressively until reaching its present level of 9 percent in 2002. The SG 
system has been one reason for the strong trend toward defined contribution funds over 
the past decade. However, employer contributions to defined benefit funds established 
before 1992 count toward an employer’s SG obligations and must meet the minimum 9 
percent requirement. 
Employer SG contributions are fully vested in the employee and must be preserved until 
retirement on or after age 55, a minimum age that will be increased gradually to reach 60 
in 2025. With some exceptions, fund members are able to transfer their benefits between 
funds when they change employment – this applies both to defined contribution funds 
and to fully-funded defined benefit schemes (where a lump sum equivalent to the vested 
pension benefit will be determined and paid). Commencing in mid-2005, the rights of 
many employees to choose their fund at any time were extended. 
The government’s objectives with pillar two were to augment private savings so that they 
could supplement the age pension as a source of retirement income, thereby reducing the 
pressure on budget funding which would otherwise grow rapidly as the average age of the 
population increased. 
The third pillar of Australia’s income retirement arrangements - voluntary saving - is 
encouraged by various taxation concessions. These have resulted in rapid growth over the 
past decade in self-managed superannuation by the self-employed, proprietors of small 
businesses and others with the time and financial acumen to manage their own 
investments.  
Statistics do not differentiate between contributions and assets invested under the second 
and third pillars. Nor is the distinction between second and third pillar important for the 
prudential regulator, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). APRA 
  3supervises the bulk of the superannuation industry and its prudential responsibilities are 
the same whether contributions are made voluntarily or under second pillar compulsion.  
The value of assets in superannuation funds of all kinds at end 2005 was just under 
$A850 billion. This has increased strongly in real terms over the past decade and a half, 
having been a little over $A100 billion at the beginning of the 1990s. As an indicator of 
the social and economic importance of the industry, total funds invested now constitute 
about 45 percent of Australian households’ stock of financial assets and they exceed 
Australia’s 2005 gross domestic product of just under $A820 billion. 
Of funds with more than four members in 2005, some 50 percent of assets were in 
accumulation, or defined contribution, funds and another 47 percent were in funds 
offering a combination of accumulation and defined benefits. Only 3 percent were in pure 
defined benefit funds, compared with 22 percent ten years before. While the importance 
of defined benefit funds has declined sharply in the past decade, the reported assets of 
defined benefit funds understate the present value of their future payment obligations 
because some large public sector schemes are not fully funded.  
Most superannuation assets are managed under trust arrangements whereby the legal and 
beneficial ownership of assets are separated. The trustee legally owns the assets of the 
trust but is required by law to manage them in the interests of the persons nominated in 
the legal instrument, most commonly a trust deed, which establishes the trust.   
Although they have a common basic legal structure, it is useful to classify funds into a 
small number of distinct governance types. Retail, or public offer, funds offer 
superannuation investments to the general public, including employers not wanting to 
establish occupational funds. The trustee is a corporation with a board of directors and is 
often associated with an insurance company or bank. They comprise 32 per cent of 
industry assets.   
Industry funds draw membership from a defined industry segment (such as construction, 
retail or hospitality) and are generally associated with trade unions which have negotiated 
compulsory membership with employers; the relevant employers and unions must 
appoint equal numbers of trustees.  In 2005 these funds held 16 percent of industry assets.  
Corporate funds hold 7 percent of industry assets.  They are established by an individual 
employer for its employees – employer and employees each appoint half the members of 
the trustee board (‘equal representation’).  Public sector funds (17 percent of assets) are 
run by the central and state governments for their employees.  ‘Small funds’ are defined 
as those with fewer than five members – in these funds the members and trustees are 
identical and there is no need for prudential regulation.  However, members who do not 
wish to operate these funds may appoint an APRA-regulated corporate trustee. There are 
approximately 320,000 such funds, with 23 percent of industry assets; most are regulated 
by the Australian Taxation Office, with APRA having responsibility for only about 
6,700.  
Leaving aside the ‘small funds’, there is considerable dispersion in the average size of 
funds, with the corporate funds generally much smaller than the others.  Table 1 
summarizes the current structure of the industry. 
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Fund type  Number of funds  Total assets 
      ($Ab) 
 Average 
   assets            
  ($Am) 
Retail                  194          272      1,402 
Industry                86          137      1,593 
Corporate              681            56          82 
Public sector                43          142      3,302 
Small funds       319,492          194   
Other              127            45   











  Source: APRA 
 
All classes of funds (other than ‘small funds’) have been consolidating for some time. 
Corporate funds have been declining particularly rapidly in both number and share of 
industry assets as costs of administration increase and the early-1990s introduction of 
near-universal employer superannuation has eroded any competitive benefits from 
offering in-house superannuation. This trend has been given substantial new impetus 
recently by the introduction of more stringent prudential regulations, including for fund 
governance and risk management, and the requirement that all funds be licensed by the 
middle of 2006.  As a result, the number of funds, excluding ‘small funds’, at end-June 
2006 was 872, less than half than two years earlier.  
 
Table 2: Superannuation Funds: Asset Allocation (percent) 
         Asset class        2004       2000       1995 
Cash and deposits           8.3         6.5          6.8 
Loans and placements           3.6         4.9          4.4 
Interest-bearing securities         16.0       18.5        25.3 
Equities and units in trusts         48.5       43.1        38.5 
Land and buildings           5.2         5.3          6.9 
Other domestic assets           1.8         2.7          4.1 
Total domestic         83.3       80.9        86.1 
Assets overseas         16.7       19.1        13.9 




A new classification of investments was introduced for 2005 and shows: Australian 
equities (33 percent), international equities (23 percent), Australian fixed interest (13 
percent), international fixed interest (5 percent), listed and unlisted property (8 percent), 
cash (7 percent) and other (10 percent). 
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expense of domestic fixed interest securities. Forces driving this have included the move 
of Australia’s central government budget into surplus, the growth of the equity market 
(and its strength over the past few years compared with many other equity markets) and 
the use by trustees of more sophisticated investment managers. 
Outsourcing is a common and growing feature of the industry, encompassing fund 
administration, asset custodianship, and investment advice and management. In 2005, 
excluding the ‘small funds’, 74 percent of funds used an external administrator 
(compared with 67 percent in 2002), 38 percent used an external investment manager (30 
percent) and 29 percent used a custodian (12 percent). 
Another increasingly common feature of the industry is the availability of choice to 
members within a fund of an asset portfolio or portfolios. About two-fifths of funds 
(excluding ‘small funds’) offer choice their members – in 2005 retail funds offered an 
average of 59 options, while industry funds offered an average of seven options, public 
sector funds offered six and corporate funds had four. 
The multiplicity and diversity of funds has created significant challenges for the 
regulatory system and necessarily influenced its approach. Supervision has also had to 
take account of the prevalence of outsourcing to third parties, itself a consequence of the 
smallness of many funds. On the other hand, the supervisory system has benefited from 
the relative sophistication of Australia’s financial system, with strong standards of 
corporate regulation and accounting, and well-developed financial markets. 
III.  Prudential Regulation in the 1990s 
Prudential supervision of Australian pension funds effectively commenced in 1993 
following the introduction of the mandatory SG arrangements. The 1993 regime 
emphasized the fiduciary responsibilities of trustees for the prudent management of funds 
and deemed these to be included in the governing rules of each fund. As stated in 
legislation
1 these responsibilities were, inter alia, to: 
•  act honestly in all matters concerning the entity 
•  exercise, in relation to all matters affecting the entity, the same degree of 
care, skill and diligence as an ordinary prudent person would exercise in 
dealing with property of another for whom the person felt morally bound 
to provide 
•  ensure that the trustee’s duties and powers are performed and exercised in 
the best interest of the beneficiaries.   
The legislation buttressed these principles with specific prescriptions aimed at reducing 
the riskiness of superannuation investments, as well as dealing with retirement incomes 
policy (e.g. vesting, preservation and prompt payment), equitable treatment of members, 
financial accounts, information disclosure and various other matters. Statutory 
requirements with a prudential object included that funds should use the investments in 
their care solely to meet retirement incomes and should not borrow or give charge over 
                                                 
1 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
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equal employee and employer representation on employer-sponsored and industry funds. 
Restrictions on investments aimed to prevent the gross misuse of funds. They included 
prohibitions on trustees or investment managers lending money to (or acquiring assets 
from) members, or making loans to (or investing in) employer-sponsors beyond a 
specified limit, and a requirement that all investments be made on arm’s length terms. 
Where the trustee appointed an investment manager, it had to ensure that it received 
adequate information about investments and their performance. 
Beyond that, in relation to investment, the legislation contained only a general 
requirement that trustees formulate and give effect to an investment strategy that took 
into account risk and return, diversification, liquidity the ability of the entity to discharge 
its existing and prospective liabilities.
2 
The regulator, at that time the Insurance and Superannuation Commission (ISC), 
supplemented this legislative requirement with a guidance circular that emphasized the 
need for trustees to have a well-articulated and documented investment strategy.  There 
was no prescription of particular investment classes and no quantitative requirements 
relating to investment earnings.  In the mid 1990s, amid general concern about the growth 
in derivatives markets, the ISC required that funds with derivatives exposures have a risk 
management statement that explained and limited such exposures. This policy did not 
restrict the use of derivatives, except that their use for speculative purposes was 
forbidden. 
From 1997 the Insurance and Superannuation Commission required the approved trustees 
of public offer funds to submit to it a ‘prudential management certificate’, an attestation 
that the board is aware of its responsibilities for prudent management, that board and 
management has assessed the risks that could arise and has systems in place to manage 
those risks and to comply with their statutory responsibilities and that there were 
procedures in place to monitor the appropriateness and adequacy of business systems and 
that they are operating effectively. 
External auditors of funds also had a prudential role. As well as reporting in the usual 
way on funds’ financial accounts, after 1995 auditors were required to conduct an audit 
on each fund’s compliance with the conduct provisions in the legislation. (This did not 
extend to the general investment provision described above.) The auditor was required to 
advise the trustees of any likely contraventions of the legislation or if, in its opinion, the 
financial position of the fund was, or might become, unsatisfactory. Only if trustees did 
not address such concerns adequately did the auditor need to inform the regulator.  
As noted, only trustees of public offer funds were subject to regulatory approval before 
accepting superannuation contributions, and only they were required to observe a 
minimum capital requirement to absorb operational losses.  
Trustees of defined benefit funds were required to commission an actuarial valuation 
every three years and to comply with resulting recommendations on the adequacy of the 
fund’s resources to meet its liabilities. Subsequently the regulator was empowered to 
                                                 
2 ibid., s. 52(f). 
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financial strength. Actuaries had similar whistle-blowing obligations as those of auditors. 
Other regulatory tools used by the Insurance and Superannuation Commission included 
desk reviews and on-site visits and an array of enforcement powers.  
Under this regulatory regime of the 1990s the incidence of serious problems with pension 
funds proved very low. However, the absence of entry tests for major segments of the 
industry, the large number of funds (relative to the regulator’s resources) and the 
inadequacy of statistical data for risk assessment made effective oversight problematic. 
This was particularly so with small to medium sized funds, many of which were marked 
by lack of financial sophistication and demonstrated a poor understanding of trustee 
responsibilities.  
IV.  Evolution of Risk-Based Regulation 
This section summarizes the main drivers for more sophisticated risk-based supervision 
and the significant enhancements recently introduced. 
1.  Drivers for Change 
Drivers of the evolution in regulation have included: 
•  change in the organization of regulatory agencies 
•  continuing attempts to resolve the mismatch between the large number of 
superannuation funds and the limited supply of supervisory resources 
(both people and powers) 
•  a small number of failures among funds 
•  regulatory concern about incomplete compliance with conduct rules and 
poor governance practices, particularly among small and medium-sized 
funds. 
1.1. Organizational  change 
Reorganization of Australia’s regulatory agencies involved the creation of APRA in 
1998, and followed recommendations of the Financial System Inquiry (also known as 
the ‘Wallis committee’ after its chairman) which an incoming government established 
in 1996. The reorganization brought together supervision of banks, life insurers, 
general insurers and most of the superannuation sector and provided the opportunity 
to use supervision techniques used in one sector across the whole financial system.  
Other regulators with interests in superannuation are the Australian Taxation Office 
which regulates the great majority of small, self-managed funds that do not warrant 
prudential regulation and the Australian Investments and Securities Commission 
(ASIC), which is responsible for disclosure to members, market conduct and the 
member complaints arrangements (the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal).  
1.2 Resources 
The Wallis committee expected the creation of APRA to reduce the cost of prudential 
regulation.  APRA’s steps to unify employment conditions across the staff it had 
inherited from the predecessor agencies and to relocate all policy and research 
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expected by the Wallis committee and government - meant that the number of 
regulatory staff declined. In mid 2000 APRA had total staff of 400, compared with 
approximately 550 engaged in prudential regulation before 1998. 
In time, this reduction made even more obvious than previously the mismatch 
between numbers of superannuation funds, the tools available for effective risk-based 
supervision and the resources devoted to the task.  
1.3 Fund  failures 
A third influence on supervisory evolution was the investment losses that emerged in 
small funds administered by two approved trustees around 2000. These losses, which 
amounted to some $A35 million and were due to the failure of speculative 
commercial investments, were tiny relative to the total superannuation sector but their 
impact on many of the individual beneficiaries affected was severe. 
There was a strong community and government view that the regulatory system 
should have prevented – or at least mitigated – the losses of these fund members.  
Although in the larger of the two failures there was evidence of fraudulent conduct 
and misrepresentation by trustees, and eventually investors were compensated under 
an industry-funded scheme designed for such situations, investigations found that a 
more aggressive regulatory approach could have reduced the losses. In particular, 
there were calls for APRA to take a closer interest in the investment strategies 
adopted by trustees and to pursue signs of problems earlier and more vigorously. 
Around the same time as these episodes, a large APRA-regulated general insurance 
company (HIH Insurance) failed and prominent non-financial corporations collapsed 
in Australia and the United States.  
1.4 Framework  weaknesses 
This background provided fertile ground when in 2001 APRA first proposed a 
significant strengthening of the risk-based supervision framework for superannuation. 
Its proposals drew on lessons from the two trustee failures and on accumulating 
experience of a widespread poor compliance culture among smaller and medium-
sized funds.  
APRA had become increasingly concerned about inadequate standards of trusteeship, 
particularly in corporate funds where abuses of the ‘in house assets’ and arm’s length 
investment requirements were not uncommon. Other problems included poor 
understanding by some trustees of the rudiments of risk management and, associated 
with that, excessive reliance on third party service providers. It was also unhappy 
about the poor quality and timeliness of information provided by funds, such 
information having considerable importance when resource constraints made frequent 
on-site inspections impossible.  Concerns in these areas were outlined in APRA’s 
  91999 annual report.
3  In 2001 the focus was on investment strategies that did not 
appear to have been designed in the best interests of fund members.
4 
APRA regulators also questioned why key features of the standard banking/insurance 
supervisory model should not be adapted for use with superannuation - features 
including universal licensing to control entry to the industry more effectively, a more 
prescriptive approach to the minimum acceptable features of risk management 
systems, and the application of prudential standards on the fitness and propriety of 
industry participants and on outsourcing that were then under development for the 
other sectors. APRA’s post-1999 organization structure that eschewed specialist 
industry divisions encouraged such questioning. 
1.5  Superannuation inquiry 2002 
Late in 2001 the government commissioned a report from a superannuation working 
group (SWG) on improving the safety of superannuation. The working group was 
chaired by a non-executive member of APRA’s board and its report, completed late in 
2002, concluded that it was an opportune time to review the existing prudential 
regulatory framework from a ‘preventative maintenance’ perspective. 
The working group’s recommendations were mostly adopted by the government and, 
when carried into legislation, became the basis for reforms recently introduced by 
APRA. 
The revised supervisory framework strengthens APRA’s powers over entry 
(licensing) and the fitness and propriety of persons in the industry, spells out in more 
detail what APRA expects in risk management plans and the resources available to 
funds and introduces tougher attestation and whistle-blowing rules. APRA also 
updated its statistical reporting framework to provide more powerful statistics for 
making risk assessments. 
2.  Strengthening the Risk-Based Policy Framework 
The main elements of the revised framework introduced over 2004-2006 were as 
follows. 
2.1  Licensing and registration 
All trustees must now be licensed by APRA, and all superannuation funds with a 
licensed trustee must be registered. Previously, APRA licensed only trustees of public 
offer funds (‘approved trustees’).  
Licenses are available to trustee corporations or, where the trustee board consists of 
individuals, to group/s of individual trustees. There are two main classes of license – 
public offer and non-public offer. Applicants for the former have to meet the capital 
requirements. 
                                                 
3 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Annual Report 1999, Sydney, p.20. 
4 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Annual Report 2001, Sydney, p.9. 
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regulated financial institutions and permits APRA to identify, and to bar, problematic 
trustees before they have accepted any investments. 
2.2  Fitness and propriety standard 
Trustees need to satisfy tests of both fitness and propriety at licensing, and meet these 
on an ongoing basis. This extends the previous provisions whereby APRA could 
disqualify or remove individual trustees on grounds of misconduct, certain criminal 
convictions and bankruptcy, or if they had been associated with breaches of 
superannuation law, or were otherwise deemed to be not fit or proper.   
As to fitness, APRA does not mandate any minimum requirements for skill, education 
or experience. However, trustees must possess a basic understanding of investments, 
and be aware of key regulatory requirements, including their duties and 
responsibilities as trustees. They must also develop their own policies on acceptable 
standards of fitness and propriety taking account of the size and complexity of their 
operations. These should provide for training of trustees to ensure their knowledge is 
up to date, and must also explain how a trustee board will manage conflicts of 
interest. 
2.3  Risk management standard 
Under this standard, licensees must have policies and procedures (at both trustee and 
individual fund level) to identify, measure, monitor and manage all material risks. 
These policies and procedures, which must be submitted to APRA, must be supported 
by a formal methodology and be clearly documented.  
APRA’s guidance note on risk management advises trustees to use a well-structured 
process to identify and assess risks, possibly using a facilitated risk workshop. A 
checklist approach may be sufficient for the least complex funds, provided the trustee 
could demonstrate that it had covered the field adequately; however, the use of more 
advanced techniques is recommended.  
APRA will need to be satisfied with risk management plans before granting a license. 
Licensees must subsequently ensure that their plans are up to date and are reviewed at 
least annually; material changes must be notified to APRA. They must also notify 
APRA of any breaches, and it is an offence not to report a breach. The external 
auditors of funds must audit their risk management strategies and plans annually and 
attest to APRA that these have been implemented and are working effectively.  
These requirements for risk management plans replace, and substantially expand, the 
previous provisions for a prudential management certificate (that applied to approved 
trustees of public offer funds only) and for risk management statements in relation to 
the use of financial derivatives. 
2.4 Outsourcing  standard 
Outsourcing is widespread in the superannuation industry and can be a significant 
source of risk. The outsourcing standard aims not to restrict trustees’ use of service 
providers – predominantly administrators, investment managers and custodians - but 
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enforceable agreements.  
Licensees must have procedures to select and monitor the performance of service 
providers. Termination and default provisions must allow for cancellation of a 
contract without prejudicing the interests of fund members. In addition, the terms of 
service agreements with related entities, including employer sponsors, must be on 
arm’s length terms. Service agreements must also provide that APRA may have 
access to documents and the premises of the service provider, and may request an 
audit of the provider. 
2.5  Trustee resources standard 
This standard specifies that trustees must have adequate resources – financial, 
technical and human – to manage members’ funds prudently. It recognizes that 
benchmarks for adequacy will vary from fund to fund, and will depend importantly 
on the extent of outsourcing. 
Where trustees’ expenses are met from fees or from earnings, they must prepare 
operating budgets to demonstrate that they will remain solvent and have sufficient 
liquidity to meet payments. Where expenses are met by an employer, APRA would 
take into account the likelihood of the employer’s continuing support. Demonstrating 
sufficiency of resources will also require appropriate disaster recovery and business 
continuity plans. Where functions are outsourced, trustees will have to satisfy 
themselves about a service provider’s resources, including for disaster recovery and 
business continuity. 
2.6  Net tangible assets standard 
A trustee with a public offer license must have $A5 million in net tangible assets or a 
guarantee (or a combination of both) unless the assets under its trusteeship are held by 
a custodian who meets these requirements. 
The capital requirement has three objectives: a buffer against operational risks; 
evidence of a trustee’s commitment to its superannuation business; and an incentive 
for the trustee to manage that business well. It may also provide funds to satisfy 
member actions against trustees for liability where professional indemnity insurance 
is inadequate. 
2.7 Auditors   
The revised regime gives a significant role of the external auditors of funds. Auditors 
must audit the annual statistical returns that funds provide to APRA. They must also 
conduct annual audits of risk management strategies and plans, stating an opinion as 
to whether the trustee has complied with these strategies and plans and whether it has 
adequate systems in place to ensure future compliance. They must refer any identified 
weaknesses or contraventions to the trustee regardless of materiality. The auditor’s 
annual report, augmented by these changes, must be completed and provided to 
APRA within four months of the end of the financial year. 
Statutory whistle-blowing provisions require auditors to inform APRA at the same 
time as they notify trustees of any material contraventions of legislation that may 
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financial position of the fund may be, or may become, unsatisfactory. Another recent 
provision allows auditors (and actuaries of defined benefit funds) to give information 
to APRA if they think it would help the regulator perform its statutory 
responsibilities, and it protects the auditors from any action, claim or demand by, or 
liability to, any other party where such information is provided in good faith. In 
addition, persons providing information will have qualified privilege against self-
incrimination. 
APRA must approve auditors to carry out their responsibilities for superannuation 
funds, with tests relating to their professional qualifications.  
V.  Risk-based Supervision Today 
This section describes APRA’s current strategic objectives, its organization structure and 
its supervisory methods.  
While its objectives are well-established and its organization structure is evolving 
gradually, the agency’s tools and methods are very much in transition. The revised 
legislation and new operating standards described above became effective only in mid-
2004 and the universal licensing of existing funds was only completed at end-June 2006.  
1.   Strategic Framework 
The main law dealing with regulation of the superannuation sector, the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, has as its objective ‘to make provision for 
the prudent management’ of superannuation funds.  APRA’s purpose under the Act is 
for their supervision.  
APRA’s own stated mission is ‘to establish and enforce prudential standards and 
practices designed to ensure that, under all reasonable circumstances, financial 
promises made by institutions we supervise are met within a stable, efficient and 
competitive financial system’ (emphasis added). It describes its supervisory approach 
as ‘forward-looking, primarily risk-based, consultative, consistent and in line  with 
international best practice’ and as recognising that the ‘management and boards of 
supervised institutions are primarily responsible for financial soundness’.
5 
The ‘financial promises’ made by trustees of defined contribution superannuation 
funds are harder to define than the promises made by banks, insurers or trustees of 
defined benefit funds which can be represented by amounts of money, even if only 
approximations (as with, for instance, insurance liabilities).   
For defined contribution superannuation funds, the promise essentially draws on the 
general responsibility of trustees to manage the money of others - with the objective 
of funding their retirement incomes – honestly and as prudently as they would 
manage their own, and on the additional undertakings made in the rules and trust 
deeds of individual funds.  
APRA aims to plan its supervisory activities over a rolling three-year period, but its 
funding - and therefore detailed business plan - is determined annually. This funding 
                                                 
5 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998, s.8. 
  13is primarily on a cost-recovery basis from levies on regulated industries, with the levy 
rates determined at the beginning of each year by the responsible minister of 
government. The minister strikes levy rates for each industry sector with the objective 
of raising funds sufficient to cover APRA’s planned activities in relation to that sector 
in the year ahead. Industry groups can make representations to the government about 
these plans before levy rates are determined. The government has also, on occasion, 
given APRA special funding for particular projects.  
APRA is ultimately accountable to Australia’s federal parliament, but not to the 
provincial governments, and it must report annually to parliament on its activities. 
External scrutiny of the agency’s performance occurs through a variety of channels, 
including standing and ad hoc parliamentary committees and performance audits by 
the national audit office. The Financial Sector Advisory Council, comprising senior 
representatives of industry, reports annually to government on the working of the 
regulatory system. Before making changes in its regulations or standards APRA must 
lodge a Regulatory Impact Statement with government, explaining the rationale for 
change, summarizing the estimated costs and benefits and describing its consultation 
with affected parties.  
2.   Organization of APRA 
APRA is a corporate body established by legislation in 1998. From 1998 to 2003, a 
nine-person board comprising people with industry experience, representatives of 
other government agencies and a chief executive officer headed APRA.  Since 2003, 
three full-time executives - one of whom is designated as chair – have governed the 
organization. The government appoints these people for terms of up to five years, and 
there is provision for another two appointees who may be part-time. A person may 
not be a member of this governing group if he or she is also a director, officer or 
employee of a body regulated by APRA.  
Below its governing group, APRA has five main divisions6. Resources devoted to 
superannuation supervision are dispersed through the agency, rather than being 
concentrated in one area.  
‘Front-line’ supervisory staff in the Specialized and Diversified Institutions Divisions 
are assigned a number of institutions, usually from more than one (but not more than 
two) industry sectors – the number of entities will depend on their size and 
complexity, and the staff member’s experience. These people, called analysts, are the 
primary contact point between APRA and regulated entities and are the people 
primarily responsible for their routine supervision, including both off-site analysis 
and on-site reviews. They are organized in branches or divisions headed by a senior 
manager who reports ultimately to the executive general manager of Specialized or 
Diversified Institutions Division.  
In their supervisory and analytical work, the analysts call on the various Supervisory 
Support teams where the depth of specialist technical expertise is greater. People 
from these teams also participate in routine or special-purpose on-site reviews. 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 1 
  14The enforcement teams, with support from legal services, will take primary 
responsibility when a fund has been classified as ‘mandated improvement’ in 
PAIRS/SOARS (see below) or is in serious difficulty and is required to restructure.  
The reasons for having a separate enforcement unit are to concentrate specialist skills 
in the use of APRA’s statutory and regulatory powers, to introduce staff without 
historical relationships with funds’ trustees and management that might cloud 
regulatory judgment, and to send a clear message to an entity that APRA regards its 
current situation as unacceptable.  
Meanwhile, the Policy, Research and Statistics division works on improvements in 
supervision policy - as expressed in law, regulations and operating standards - and is 
the central collection point for quantitative research and for collecting and 
distributing statistics on regulated entities. 
In addition, a dedicated unit for fund licensing directed and coordinated the licensing 
of all existing funds in the run up to the June 2006 licensing deadline. 
Cross-divisional groups of middle/senior management have been formed for 
superannuation and the other main industry sectors to establish an APRA-wide 
consensus on the application of policies and help ensure consistency of application. 
They also seek to identify emerging supervisory issues, partly through acting as a 
sounding board for industry participants and representative groups, and referring 
those as necessary to other parts of the agency including its senior policy-making 
fora.  In March 2006 APRA had staff of 608 one third of whom are engaged in the 
supervision of superannuation funds. 
3.   Methods and Procedures 
APRA’s supervision of superannuation funds combines off-site analysis and on-site 
review in a continuous cycle of risk assessment, supervisory action (where necessary) 
and fund response.  
Risk assessment draws upon the regular statistical information provided by funds, 
their risk management strategies and plans, audit and actuarial reports, discussions 
with trustees, direct on-site observation and member complaints. For large funds, 
public information such as media reports and investment ratings is also monitored. 
Where APRA has requested additional information or explanation, or has required 
that remedial action be effected by trustees, the quality and timeliness of trustee 
response will also be taken into account in a fund’s risk assessment. 
3.1  The PAIRS/SOARS model 
APRA applies the same broad supervisory model to superannuation funds as to 
banks, other deposit-takers and insurance companies and has done so since late 2002.  




Inherent risk minus Management and control equals Net risk 
Net risk minus Capital support equals Overall risk 
 
 
Some variation in use is required for defined contribution superannuation where, as 
discussed, trustees have broad responsibilities to the members of a fund but do not 
make specific promises about performance. An assessment of capital support is, 
therefore, irrelevant (except for public offer trustee companies) and ‘overall risk’ is 
the same as ‘net risk’.
 7 
The measure of overall risk is then combined with the size of an entity to determine 
APRA’s supervisory approach. This recognizes that, with limited resources, APRA 
must give more attention to larger entities than smaller ones; financial weakness in a 
large fund will affect the interests of more members and will pose greater risk to 
confidence in the superannuation system (and its regulation) as a whole. This regard 
for entity size is consistent with the risk-based approach to regulation. 
For a defined contribution superannuation fund, the combined model involves the 
following steps: 
•  Assessing a fund’s gross inherent riskiness 
•  Assessing its net riskiness, after allowing for the presence of various risk 
controls or mitigants 
•  Assigning a descriptive probability or risk rating  
•  Measuring the fund’s assets – a proxy for its importance or impact  
•  Assigning a descriptive impact rating  
•  Combining the probability and impact rating (PAIRS) 
•  Mapping from the PAIRS rating to a supervisory attention index 
•  Adopting a supervisory stance and consequential supervisory action plan. 
 





                                                 
7 B.Allen, ‘APRA’s risk rating of superannuation funds’, APRA Insight, First Quarter 
2004, pp. 19-30. 




























The combined model is known as PAIRS/SOARS, referring to the Probability and 
Impact Rating System and the Supervisory Oversight and Response System. 
An assessment of capital support or financial strength is retained in the rating of 
defined benefit funds (and the trustee companies of public offer defined contribution 
funds).  In this case financial strength is measured by the extent to which the fund’s 
assets cover its short-term and actuarially estimated long-term pension obligations, by 
its earnings performance and by its access to additional capital (for instance, from 
associated employers) if needed. It is analogous to assessing capital adequacy in the 
case of banks and insurers. 
The method of assessing riskiness and impact, PAIRS, is essentially a structured 
framework within which supervisors make assessments and reach judgments about 
the risk areas that are important for each fund and whether they are well managed or 
not. 
For all APRA-regulated entities, the PAIRS assessment of gross inherent risk 
considers: 
•  counterparty default risk: risk of losses from failure of a counterparty to meet 
its obligations 
•  balance sheet and market risk: risk of losses due to movements in interest 
rates and other market prices 
•  insurance risk: insurance underwriting risk, or the risk that insurance cover 
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  17•  operational risk: the risk of losses resulting from inadequate internal 
processes, people and systems – whether these are internal to the regulated 
entity or in a service provider 
•  liquidity risk: the risk that an institution will not be able to meet its payment 
obligation as they fall due without excessive cost   
•  legal and regulatory risk: the likelihood of adverse consequences arising from 
failure to comply with all relevant laws and regulations 
•  strategic risk: risks to the continued viability of an entity as a result of change 
in the operating environment, including internally driven change such as 
merger or introduction of a new product line 
•  contagion and related party risk: risks to an entity’s business as a result of 
close association with another entity – the risks may be direct through 
financial exposure or indirect through reputation damage. 
For superannuation funds, the most significant risks are likely to be balance 
sheet/market (from exposure to losses from movements in share prices, real estate 
prices and interest rates), operational (record-keeping, management of outsourcing 
contracts) and trustee fitness and propriety. These priorities are reflected in the five 
new operating standards for superannuation funds that were discussed earlier.  
Strategic risk may also be important where funds are amalgamating or otherwise 
expanding rapidly, and regulatory risks can be significant given the complexity of the 
taxation, disclosure, retirement income and prudential requirements. Insurance risk 
can be important for funds offering death and disability cover, while contagion risk 
can be significant for employer-sponsored funds, especially if they offer defined 
benefits. 
The controls or mitigants of these gross risks are classified in PAIRS as: 
•  quality of the governing board/trustees: covers their understanding of 
responsibilities, their experience, competence and integrity and the presence 
of conflicts of interest   
•  the quality of senior management: its experience, competence and integrity  
•  effectiveness of operational management: this is defined to include human 
resource policies (recruitment and training) and, where relevant, management 
of outsourced operations by trustees 
•  a fund’s information systems and financial controls: capacity to produce 
timely and reliable information for regulators and members 
•  adequacy of risk management systems: quality of arrangements for 
determining risk appetite, identifying and measuring risk, setting limits, 
monitoring compliance with those, and reporting 
•  a fund’s compliance culture and procedures: relates to compliance with laws 
and regulations and involves assessment of the competence, integrity and 
independence of responsible staff, as well as a fund’s information systems 
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and actuarial review, and requires assessment of both competence and 
independence. 
•  Where a fund has largely outsourced its operations, the supervisor needs to 
assess the systems of the external parties as well as the protections that the 
fund has under its contracts with these parties.  
3.2  Calculating PAIRS ratings 
To calculate a PAIRS rating for a superannuation fund, APRA analysts make two 
assessments against each of the 15 characteristics listed above.  
The first is an assessment of the proportionate significance or relevance of the 
characteristic for that fund, considering the nature of its structure and operations. For 
instance, a retail fund that is part of a diversified financial group and that relies 
heavily on other members of the group for outsourced services would have a 
relatively high weight assigned to ‘contagion and related party risk’ regardless of any 
assessment of the strength of those entities or the measures in place to protect the 
fund’s interests. For both inherent risk and control factors, the significance weights 
add to100. Each control element must have a weighting of at least 10 percent. 
The second assessment relates to the quality of each characteristic. Quality is the 
extent to which each contributes to (for the inherent risk areas) or reduces (for the 
management and control areas) the overall riskiness of the fund.  
Each element of inherent risk is assessed on a scale from zero to 4, ranging from very 
low risk to extreme risk. To guide their assessments and help ensure consistency in 
rating an individual fund, analysts refer to benchmark (rolling average) ratings for 
that fund’s peer group. The assessment of control factors also uses a scale from zero 
to 4, ranging from very strong to extremely weak. 
The weighted numerical assessments of the various inherent risk and control elements 
are combined into an overall net riskiness score – ranging from 0.25 to 4 - with the 
summary inherent risk rating and the summary control rating accorded equal 
weighting.   
These scores are converted to PAIRS ratings that rise exponentially, based on the 
fourth power, as the measure of financial strength measure falls. A net risk score of 2 
will convert to a PAIRS rating of 16, while a score of 4 converts to the maximum of 
256.  This non-linear feature mirrors the structure of commercial credit ratings and is 
aimed at ensuring that the riskier entities are given particularly high profile with 
APRA staff and, consequently, the requisite more intense supervisory attention.  
3.3 Impact   
After the PAIRS rating of a fund is calculated, an impact index is introduced . 
While the impacts or consequences of serious financial problems or failures of 
financial entities depend on many factors, APRA currently uses total assets as a 
simple proxy. Its impact index is a linear function of assets with a floor of $A50 
million set on the basis that any failure, no matter how small, is likely to damage the 
public’s confidence in the financial system and its regulation. Medium impact entities 
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impact from $A25 billion. About 50 superannuation funds are rated as high and the 
remainder as low. There are no extreme impact funds. 
3.4  Supervisory stance (SOARS) 
The supervisory attention index is the geometric average of the riskiness/probability 
index and the impact index. Supervisory attention increases with both riskiness and 
impact, but the composite index recognizes that there are economies of scale in the 
level of extra supervisory effort required in response to marginal increases in both 
riskiness and size. 
Table 3:  Supervisory Attention Index 
 
                                       Probability rating/index (PAIRS) 
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A score on the attention index maps to a ‘supervisory stance’ and action plan under the 
Supervisory Oversight and Response System (SOARS). The mapping, step H above, is 
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There are four generic categories in SOARS, as shown in the table: 
 
•  Normal  
In the normal supervisory mode APRA collects and analyses the standard 
statistical and other information and conducts routine on-site reviews, with a 
minimum interval of two years. 
•  Oversight 
This category involves more intense monitoring with more frequent meetings 
with trustees, meetings with auditors and collection of additional information - 
and a readiness to step up supervisory or enforcement action quickly if there is 
any further deterioration. 
•  Mandated Improvement 
When a fund is rated in this category, APRA will direct trustees to develop 
and implement plans to correct the weaknesses it has identified. These may 
originate in management, asset composition, operational controls or the 
trustee board itself. APRA may accept legally enforceable undertakings from 
trustees in regard to their remediation plans. It may also issue a ‘show cause’ 
notice requiring trustees to explain why the regulator should not take more 
severe action. 
•  Restructure 
At this point, the fund has encountered serious financial difficulty or is at risk 
of this, or members’ investments are considered to be in jeopardy from 
improper use by trustees. There may be significant breaches of the gearing 
prohibition or the ‘in-house’ investment restrictions. 
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superannuation funds these include appointing an investigator; suspending and 
replacing individuals; and issuing directions to restrict fund operations. Its primary 
objective is to ensure that members’ funds are safeguarded as far as possible. Where 
appropriate, these funds will be transferred to another trustee. Following 
investigation, disciplinary actions against the trustees, auditors and actuaries will be 
considered. Punitive actions include disqualification from further involvement in the 
superannuation industry, referral to professional bodies in the case of auditors and 
actuaries, and prosecution in the courts. 
As well as rating all funds (other than those with fewer than five members) under 
PAIRS, APRA rates approved trustees. These are exposed to operational and 
legal/regulatory risks and their capacity to manage these is important to the funds 
they administer. The more diverse and complicated their operations the greater are 
these risks. In their case the risk assessment includes an assessment of capital support, 
given trustees’ potential liability for operational and compliance failings. 
The front-line analysts/supervisors in Specialized and Diversified Institutions 
Divisions are primarily responsible for producing initial PAIRS ratings. Depending 
on a fund’s complexity, the ready availability of all relevant information and an 
analyst’s experience, a rating may take between a day and a week to complete. 
Because consistency among funds and across the two divisions is extremely 
important, and because there is inevitably a large subjective element in assessments, a 
number of checks and balances are also built into the system. These arrangements are 
designed to strike a good balance between the knowledge and judgment of front-line 
analysts/supervisors and the need for consistency and rigor in supervision across all 
APRA-regulated entities. 
Initial ratings are checked by a reviewer and the analyst’s line manager who 
subsequently ‘owns’ the rating. Staff from Supervisory Support Division may 
question (but not change) ratings and may elevate significant disagreements to 
APRA’s governing group. When confirmed, the rating fixes the SOARS position on 
the basis of which supervisors then construct the appropriate action plan. A PAIRS 
rating that sets a SOARS position of ‘mandated improvement’ or ‘restructure’ may 
only be overridden by the governing group. The PAIRS assessments for entities 
ranked as high and extreme impact are also reviewed by a panel comprising the 
responsible line manager, relevant risk specialists, an industry specialist and 
representatives of the various cross-divisional committees and chaired by a PAIRS 
expert. Other checks and balances include a specialized PAIRS team that regularly 
analyses the data and follows up on outliers and summary reports, with analysis by 
industry, by peer groups and over time provided to all analysts and management.   
  22APRA does not publish its PAIRS/SOARS ratings of individual funds and does not 
permit the funds to do so because of a concern that public reaction to negative ratings 
could hinder remediation actions and a desire to avoid supervisory ratings being used 
as a competitive device. 
3.5  Guidance for analysts  
As previously described, the information to assess a fund is assembled predominantly 
from statistical and other statutory returns filed by all funds, from audit and actuarial 
reports and from intelligence gathered by APRA staff during periodic on-site reviews 
of funds. Other sources include media reports, member complaints and information 
supplied under memoranda of understanding with other regulatory agencies. 
APRA staff use this material to make risk assessments, the major input to 
PAIRS/SOARS ratings, with the assistance of guidance manuals. These deal with 
various key aspects of an institution’s risk profile – competence of the board, strength 
of management, financial position etc. For superannuation funds there are presently 
eight such manuals or modules. 
These cover the following topics that are relevant to a PAIRS rating: 
•  the trustees of the fund 
•  the managers and staff of the fund 
•  a fund’s strategy 
•  a fund’s structure and relationships with other entities 
•  capital (relevant for defined benefit funds and trustees of public offer funds) 
•  a fund’s risk management policies and capacity 
•  a fund’s operational risk, including outsourcing 
•  balance sheet and investment risk. 
Each module summarizes the various criteria relevant to supervisory assessment of an 
area, and all significant statutory and regulatory provisions for which compliance 
must be checked. It advises on ‘what to look for’, lists documentation that the analyst 
should request from the fund, describes good practice and provides examples of 
common problems or poor practice. It also provides a template for the supervisor’s 
written findings for the review and explains how these should feed into a new or 
revised PAIRS rating.   
4.   Assessing a Fund’s Riskiness 
As described above, APRA staff produce a risk rating for a fund by assessing its 
structure, operations and balance sheet against a number of criteria. Each criterion is 
rated on a scale of 0 to 4, with six grades – for risk elements these range from ‘very 
low’ (0 to 0.5) to extreme (3.1 to 4.0); for mitigants or control elements they range 
from ‘very strong’ (0 to 0.5) to ‘extremely weak’  (3.1 to 4.0). 
The various ratings are based on qualitative, rather than quantitative, measures. A 
manual guides staff in allocating ratings to funds, advising them on what 
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characteristics. It admonishes supervisors to avoid a ‘checklist approach’, attempting 
to force a fund to fit into every listed characteristic, and encourages them to apply 
judgment and commonsense.  
The following sections summarize the guidance given on the two most prominent 
inherent risks for defined contribution superannuation funds - balance 
sheet/investment risk and operational risks. The following sections look at risk 
management generally and at capital support for defined benefit funds. 
4.1  Balance sheet/investment risk 
There are no quantitative restrictions on funds’ asset portfolios, other than the 
restrictions on ‘in house assets’ (that is, investments in an employer-sponsor and related 
entities), the sole purpose test (investments must be for the purpose of delivering 
retirement income) and prohibitions on lending to members mentioned earlier.  
APRA’s supervisory approach is to determine whether a fund has a clear investment 
strategy; to assess whether that strategy is consistent with the trustee obligations; to 
make a judgment on whether the trustees, with service providers where relevant, are 
competent to carry out that strategy; and to assess whether they are capable of 
monitoring the strategy’s implementation and adapting it to changed circumstances for 
either the fund or for markets. 
A well-run fund will have a clearly stated investment strategy (or strategies) that is 
consistent with the broad statutory requirements for prudence and appropriateness. The 
strategy will take into account objectives for risk and return and will specify policies on 
asset allocation, liquidity needs, valuation, administration and custody. It will be 
reviewed periodically to ensure it remains suitable to the needs of fund members. Other 
things equal, a fund with a higher risk portfolio will get more supervisory attention 
under PAIRS. 
Strategies will vary from fund to fund depending on such factors as the age profile of 
members, the likelihood of large-scale departures (for instance, due to retrenchment), 
the expressed risk preferences of members and the design of benefits. 
Broad objectives should be clearly stated. They may be for an absolute rate of return, or 
for a return with a certain margin above the rate of price inflation, or a margin over a 
benchmark rate. Objectives should also include a level of risk tolerance and the time 
period over which performance will be measured. 
Trustees should set allocation targets for the main asset classes consistent with the 
broad strategy or strategies adopted; these should be expressed as proportions with a 
range to allow managers some flexibility in responding to market changes and to avoid 
frequent insignificant breaches of investment mandates. The higher a fund’s target rate 
of return and its tolerance of volatility, the greater will be the allocation to growth 
assets and acceptance of relatively low diversification. The lower the tolerance of 
volatility and occasional negative returns, the greater will be the allocation to income 
assets. 
Asset portfolios must be reasonably diversified to satisfy statutory responsibilities for 
prudence, but there are no quantitative diversification targets set in regulation. APRA 
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noted, asset allocation strategies must be consistent with the fund’s objectives for 
growth and volatility, and its members’ needs; as an extreme case, a heavy weighting of 
unlisted equities would not be consistent with an ageing membership and the objective 
of steady income. Asset allocation must also cater for payment needs, with an 
appropriate proportion in cash or highly liquid fixed interest investments.  
When a fund portfolio has invested in particularly high risk or complex investments, 
such as derivatives or hedge funds, APRA’s supervisors expect trustees to have 
performed additional due diligence on the risks involved and to have sought expert 
independent advice on the risks and appropriateness of those investments for the fund’s 
investment aims.  
APRA provides specific guidance to its analysts on three asset classes – derivatives, 
direct lending and foreign investments. 
A fund investing in derivatives must have a specific risk management statement (a 
requirement since the mid 1990s) explaining how their use is consistent with the fund’s 
overall objectives and setting limits on usage. The supervisor will check on compliance 
with this statement, including: 
•  the level of understanding of the risks demonstrated by the trustees 
•  how the use of derivatives is consistent with the fund’s overall strategy 
•  whether there are limits on usage 
•  adequacy of segregation of dealing and settlement 
•  adequacy of procedures for monitoring and for re-evaluating risks 
•  extent of stress testing 
•  frequency of reporting to trustees, including any breaches of limits. 
Where derivatives investment is indirect through another party, the trustees must have 
conducted an assessment of that party to see whether its risk management controls 
would meet comparable standards. Derivatives must not be used to effectively gear the 
fund. 
Funds may engage in lending directly or indirectly, via investment in mortgage trusts 
where the underlying assets are loans to third parties. Direct lending should be 
governed by documented procedures for making the loans (including interest rates, 
loan-to-valuation ratios, valuation practices and security) and for monitoring, for 
provisioning and for write-offs. Lending to members is not permitted. 
Supervisors also scrutinize foreign investments closely to determine whether trustees 
have identified all of the risks and are capable of managing those. There must be clear 
policies for controlling exposures, including hedging strategies against exchange risk, 
for counterparty selection and limits, for adjusting portfolios in response to changing 
country risk and so on. APRA expects that a well-run fund’s asset allocation policy will 
be clearly documented and that trustees will closely monitor compliance with policy, 
whether investment is conducted in house or is outsourced.  
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considerable care in selecting, instructing and monitoring managers. Selection should 
be by competitive tender. Investment mandates from trustees to managers should 
encompass objectives for rate of return and liquidity, allowable and non-allowable asset 
classes, the use of derivatives, allocation limits, portfolio duration, fees, performance 
benchmarks and reporting. Trustees should review the performance of managers 
periodically against pre-agreed objective measures that are consistent with the fund’s 
investment aims, and should be able to change managers without disruption to the fund.  
There is no regulatory requirement for credit or investment committees but for large 
complex funds, or those with a component of high risk investments, that would be 
regarded as good practice. 
Documents consulted by APRA in assessing investment risk include balance sheet data, 
including statistics submitted quarterly (by large funds) and annually; cash flow 
statements and projections; investment mandates for external managers; investment 
manager reports; tender and evaluation documents relating to manager selection; and 
regular reports to the trustees. 
A fund receiving a ‘very low’ PAIRS rating on inherent balance sheet/investment risk 
will have well-diversified investments spread across different investment products and 
markets, and no exposure to volatility in returns. At the other end of the spectrum, a 
fund rated ‘extreme risk’ on this criterion will have a concentration of investments in 
one product or market, and high exposure to volatility. In between, a high-medium 
rating (1.6 to 2.0) is aligned with ‘some concentration’ of investments in certain 
products or markets, and ‘significant exposure’ to investment volatility. 
The aspects of the guidance summarized above that deal with discipline in investment 
processes, such as limit-setting, monitoring and reporting, will feed into the 
‘management and control’ rating. 
The widespread availability to members of choice among a number of investment 
portfolios is complicating the meaning of trustee responsibility for managing 
investment risk beyond the need for clear strategies and properly managed execution. 
APRA has taken the view that trustees retain responsibility for the prudent structure 
of a fund in aggregate (taking into account particularly the need for diversification 
and liquidity) and that they need to ensure that this is not compromised by the sub-
portfolio choices made available to or selected by members. It also requires that 
trustees provide appropriate advice and warnings to members about the risks to their 
own retirement savings from choosing only sub-portfolios that are highly 
concentrated or risky for other reasons. 
4.2  Outsourcing and other operational risks 
The PAIRS guidance manual describes a superannuation fund with very low 
operational risks as having one or more of these features: 
•  a simple legal and organization structure with clear reporting lines 
•  no reliance on related entities for core or complementary activities 
•  no outsourcing of material business activities 
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•  ‘off the shelf’ information technology systems that suit the needs of the 
business, have no history of problems and are adaptable for foreseeable 
changing needs 
•  minimal disaster threat from external events 
•  no reliance on a ‘key person’. 
•  In contrast, a fund with extreme operational risks will have: 
•  complex structures and unclear reporting lines 
•  extensive reliance for core or complementary activities on related entities not 
wholly owned within the same corporate group 
•  outsourcing of material activities to unrelated third parties, with a history of 
unresolved problems 
•  a complex business with many products and high volumes of complicated 
transactions 
•  information systems that are unable to meet business needs and/or many 
inherited/ legacy systems 
•  vulnerability to external disaster 
•  heavy reliance on one person. 
The supporting manual on operational risk covers a superannuation fund’s human 
resources policies, outsourcing, fraud prevention, administration, information 
technology systems, business continuity management, project management and the 
introduction of new products and businesses. Given the widespread use of service 
providers in the industry, outsourcing is the most significant of these for many funds. 
Consequently, it is the subject of one of the new operating standards described earlier. 
Trustees must undertake a full due diligence of any potential outsourcing partner, 
covering both its technical capacity, risk management systems and financial capacity. 
They should look at track record and consult referees. Once they are appointed by 
formal contractual arrangement, the performance of outsourced providers must be 
monitored closely and their mandates reviewed and updated as necessary. 
By regulation, outsourcing agreements must have the following elements: 
•  service monitoring arrangements, with clear description of services to be 
provided, quality standards to be met,  and agreed measurement methods and 
penalties for non-performance 
•  fee schedules and payment arrangements 
•  procedures for monitoring, including access to the provider for the fund’s 
internal and external auditors 
•  access for both the fund and APRA to relevant documents and other 
information of the service provider 
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investigate any matter relevant to the outsourcing arrangement 
•  a provision giving the fund and APRA the right to require that the provider 
have an independent audit of its activities 
•  assurances about the business continuity plans of the service provider (in the 
event of power failure or systems crash), including security of data, the 
maximum time for restoration of normal operations, emergency arrangements 
and plans for communications with members; there must also be provision for 
the fund to retain access to critical information and functions if the provider 
ceases to operate because of insolvency or other cause 
•  termination arrangements, including triggers and notice periods 
•  default arrangements, specifying default events and how and over what time 
these are to be rectified (and indemnity) 
•  transition arrangements, so that where outsourcing arrangements are 
terminated for whatever reason, agreements deal with access to records and 
software, and to otherwise protecting the interests of fund members during the 
change from one provider to another 
•  dispute resolution procedures, including resort to arbitration where necessary 
•  liability and indemnity provisions that specify the extent of liability of each 
party and whether liability for negligence is limited, and indemnity and 
insurance arrangements; trustees must know about the service provider’s 
measures to limit trustee exposure to an adverse event, including its insurance 
cover and internal audit 
•  confidentiality and security of information about the fund and its members. 
Importantly, outsourcing agreements must ensure that the terms of any sub-
contracting agreements contain equivalent provisions to those that would otherwise 
apply to the service provider itself. Where outsourcing contracts are with members of 
the same financial group, the terms including fees must be on an arm’s length basis. 
4.3 Risk  management 
The guidance module on risk management deals first with the overall inherent risk 
profile of a fund, and then with several key aspects of risk management: the role of 
the board of trustees, the development and implementation of a risk management 
framework, the risk management strategy and plan, the fund’s compliance function, 
management information systems and financial control, internal audit, external audit 
and the role of the actuary in a defined benefit fund. It therefore overlaps substantially 
with various other parts of the regulatory framework, in particular the new regulatory 
standard on risk management summarized in section 4.2. 
In relation to inherent risk, the guidance emphasizes that the two main sources of risk 
for superannuation funds are balance sheet/investment risk and operational risks 
including poorly managed outsourcing (discussed above).  
  28It notes that, apart from the risks from outsourcing, operational risks can be greatest 
when processes are not properly documented and monitored, when management 
structures and intra-group relations are complex, when computerized information 
systems have become dated, when trustee boards do not understand their 
responsibilities, when funds are merging, when funds have to cope with unusually 
large transaction volumes, when there is significant change in products offered to 
members, or when there is a lot of change in regulation. 
Among the seven risk mitigants in PAIRS ratings, two particularly important ones are 
a fund’s general risk management framework and its operational management. 
A fund rated ‘very strong’ on risk management will have: 
•  a board that understands all major risks, and exercises strong stewardship 
•  a effective, disciplined risk management framework that is regularly reviewed 
and endorsed by the board 
•  a dedicated risk management function to ensure that the framework is up to 
date and being complied with, and having a direct line of communication to 
the board 
•  clear senior management delegations 
•  proactive risk identification and control systems 
•  a strong risk culture throughout. 
A fund with none or few of these features will be rated extremely weak in risk 
management. APRA has not mandated a centralised risk management function, but it 
will give higher marks under PAIRS to a fund that has an area of management 
charged with identifying all inherent risks and their mitigants, ensuring that the 
mitigants are working effectively and ensuring that this risk management framework 
is up to date - and reporting periodically on all this to the board of trustees. In a large 
retail fund this function might not cover the entire risk management framework itself 
but would coordinate the necessary inputs from relevant areas - operational,   
investment etc. Ideally, this area would also have some authority to monitor and 
enforce compliance with the risk management policies endorsed by the board of 
trustees. One of APRA's practice notes emphasizes that staff responsible for 
monitoring and enforcing compliance with risk policies should have authority 
independent of the units they oversee. 
In the area of operational management, a very strong rating would flow from: 
•  business line managers with significant experience and expertise, operating 
effectively as a team 
•  low turnover of experienced staff 
•  an effective management structure with clear delegated responsibilities and 
reporting 
•  normal succession planning. 
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This is a critical input to PAIRS ratings of banks and insurance companies, but it is 
not relevant for most superannuation funds which are defined contribution in 
structure. An assessment of capital support is however made for trustees of public 
offer funds and for defined benefit funds. 
For trustees, the rating takes into account the current capital coverage relative to the 
regulatory minimum, earnings and access to additional capital if needed.  
Defined benefit funds are rated as having ‘very strong’ capital coverage with a 
solvency ratio of at least 1.5 and ‘extremely weak’ if that ratio is below 1. They are 
also rated on current earnings and on the availability of additional capital, if needed, 
from their employer-sponsors. The latter assessment takes into account the extent to 
which an employer is legally required to ensure the fund meets it obligations to 
members, the extent to which the sponsor has demonstrated that commitment in the 
past and the financial capacity of the employer. 
4.5 Small  funds 
To expedite the initial PAIRS rating of superannuation sector APRA has adopted an 
abbreviated process for the large number of funds with assets less than $A50 million.  
These funds represent about 60 percent by number of all APRA-regulated financial 
institutions requiring a rating, but they hold less than one percent of the assets.  
In line with APRA’s broader risk-based approach to prudential supervision, it is using 
a streamlined and largely automated rating for these entities.  The building blocks of 
the PAIRS model are condensed and the prudential returns submitted by these small 
funds subjected to automated analysis under a series of decision rules.  
A draft PAIRS rating is then provided to the responsible analyst, with information on 
the basis for the rating. Analysts can accept or amend the rating based on any 
additional knowledge of the institution that they might have.   
5. Usefulness  of  PAIRS 
PAIRS has been a significant step forward for APRA, as an integrated risk-based 
regulator, because it formalizes a common language and common approach across 
each industry and between industries – even though the detailed supervisory activities 
differ because of specific industry characteristics and practices.  It imposes a stronger 
analytical discipline to a still largely judgmental process and provides an audit trail to 
analyze or explain supervisory decisions and actions.  
The PAIRS/SOARS framework has also strengthened the link from risk assessment 
to intensity of supervision, and from there to the allocation of resources within 
APRA. It also provides a statistical record of trends in the riskiness of the financial 
system and its component sectors over time, and may indicate where statutory and 
regulatory requirements should be tightened or otherwise changed. In the future 
PAIRS ratings could be used in determining risk-based levies to fund APRA or risk-
based premia for industry-funded protection schemes. 
There are also potential pitfalls. The rating process is complex and could encourage a 
checklist approach to supervision. The requirement that analysts justify each 
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fund has significant weaknesses that are not captured in the PAIRS taxonomy and 
might therefore be overlooked. 
Finally, the rating process unavoidably remains largely judgmental. This means that 
validation will always be difficult, that achieving consistency will be a challenge and 
that the quality of the ratings will rely heavily on the experience and skill of the 
people compiling them. 
6.   Statistics 
In view of the large number of funds, APRA’s supervision - including constructing 
the PAIRS ratings - relies heavily on statistical and other information supplied by 
funds.  
Funds with assets of $A50 million or more must provide information quarterly, while 
all APRA-regulated funds must submit an audited annual return within four months 
of the end of the year. These returns are submitted electronically by a system which 
lets funds enter data, validate the information entered and then digitally sign and 
submit the information in an encrypted form.  
6.1 Annual  attestation 
Trustees of these superannuation entities are required to submit each year a signed 
attestation that information provided to APRA accurately shows the fund’s financial 
position and transactions, and that the trustee has adequate reporting systems and 
internal controls supporting preparation of its financial information. 
7.   Human Resources Policies 
APRA aims to have a mix of staff with industry experience (who may stay with the 
agency for a few years) and staff who intend to make a career in prudential 
regulation. It recruits junior supervisory staff on graduation from university, primarily 
with degrees in finance, commerce, accounting, economics and actuarial studies. It 
recruits people into middle and senior management roles who have experience in the 
finance sector – from both regulated industries and sectors such as accountants and 
actuaries.  
APRA’s remuneration rates are related to movements in finance sector market rates 
but the agency’s budget constrains it to a benchmark well below the median market 
rates. As a result, APRA has some difficulty in attracting and retain as many high 
quality supervisory staff as it would like to employ. Many of the best professionals 
with two or three years’ experience are attractive to commercial employers in the 
finance sector, particularly regulated entities. 
Apart from on-the-job learning, training for APRA’s staff includes in-house general 
and specialist tuition in prudential regulation and attendance at external seminars and 
conferences. Staff shortages and concerns about confidentiality of information have 
limited the use of short-term secondments to industry as a training device. APRA has 
also had a policy to rotate staff among its front-line and supervision divisions as a 
training tool, but staff shortages and work pressures have hampered its 
implementation. 
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Before the introduction of PAIRS and SOARS APRA applied only very crude means 
of determining its supervisory priorities for superannuation funds based largely on 
size and very clear evidence of problems.  The risk-based framework has allowed 
much better targeting of resources to higher risk to assessing and remediating higher 
risk funds. It is too early to do a comprehensive assessment of the impact the risk-
based framework has had on the effectiveness of supervision.  As experience with the 
PAIRS risk model had accumulated, APRA has been assessing its diagnostic value by 
tracking the ‘migration’ of institutions between the different supervisory stances. 
Since the model was introduced, for example, a much higher proportion of 
institutions in the ‘Mandated Improvement’ stance were upgraded rather than 
downgraded to ‘Restructure’; a significant number also exited the industry in an 
orderly fashion. This provides some confirmation that the PAIRS/SOARS framework 
has helped to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of APRA’s intervention. 
In future APRA will also be able to use outputs from the PAIRS/SOARS model to 
produce indicators of the prudential standing of the industry at points in time, and 
trends in that over time. These are, of course, only very approximate indicators of the 
contribution made by prudential regulation. Some more useful measures of 
supervisory effectiveness will also be available – for instance, the speed with which 
funds that fall into the ‘restructure’ category are returned to ‘oversight’ or  ‘normal’ 
as a result of APRA’s actions.   
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Specialized Institutions:  
Supervising stand-alone financial entities, 
including the majority of superannuation funds 
by number; on-site review and off-site analysis; 
PAIRS/SOARS ratings 
Diversified Institutions:  
Supervising financial conglomerate groups, 
including many large retail funds; on-site 
review and off-site analysis; PAIRS/SOARS 
ratings 
Supervisory Support:  
              Industry technical specialists 
              Actuarial services 
              Specialist risk services 
              Legal services 
              Enforcement  
Policy, Research and Statistics: 
              Policy development 
              Quantitative analysis 
              Statistics 
              International relations 
Corporate: 
              Human resources 
              Information technology 
              Finance 
              Internal audit 
              Business improvement 
              Public affairs 
              Secretariat 